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VPart 1 of this article was originally called “A note on Gestalt Ontology” and 
was written in 1992. Part 2 was called “Notes on Gestalt Ontology” and was 
written in 1995. The two pieces were combined and edited for publication here 
by Alan Drengson. Neither has been published before. art 1 
he slogan most commonly used to introduce gestalt perception is: 
The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” But using the example 
f a known melody, the more characteristic feature is the influence of 
he whole upon each part. Whatever the part of the melody that is heard, 
he particular character of the whole influences the experience of the 
art. A ‘part’ of a gestalt is more than a part. That is, if we listen to a 
art of an unknown melody the experience is different from listening to 
hat part when the melody is known.  
oving from the consideration of gestalt perception of gestalt 
pperception or thinking, the characteristic part/whole relation is even 
ore clearly that of parts ‘being more than parts.’ It is tempting to use 
he old slogan aliquid stat pro aliquo used in characterizing the relation 
f a word and what it stands for, only that in this case every individual 
art of the gestalt ‘stands for’ the total gestalt without losing its 
ndividuality. Using the example of being in a known forest, a forest of 
hich we have an apperception, however imperfect, a tiny part of it 
isually present when walking in it, provides an experience influenced, 
r better, determined, by the apperception of the forest as a whole. The 
xperience of the part somehow contains an experience of the whole. If 
his seems queer to some, it is to be due to a too strong attachment to 
he more or less abstract spatial aspect of the forest. 
f now part of the forest (considered in its spatial aspect) is changed, for 
nstance by a road of a certain kind or houses or industrial undertakings, 
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the forest as a gestalt may remain the same, change, or vanish. 
Experiments on the apperception of Norwegian forests suggest that the 
introduction of a small scale traditional farm house with a narrow road 
will not change the gestalt because for hundreds of years forests in 
Norway have not been entirely without settlements. On the other hand, 
there may be roads or developments which severely change or destroy 
the gestalt. The latter implies that walking or being in the forest, in 
whatever part of it we consider, there is an experience of a specific kind 
that is destroyed. It is usually said that the forest remains really the 
same except for a, perhaps tiny, part. This is misleading in so far as the 
spatial arrangement is taken to be the real forest, whereas the forest as a 
gestalt is taken to be subjective. For gestalt thinking or ontology, there 
exists no such spatial reality which can be isolated from the reality of 
the gestalt. ‘Parts’ being easily thought of as spatial, it may be 
misleading to speak of parts of a gestalt, better to speak of subordinate 
gestalts. The so-called parts of a sonata as a gestalt will be meaningful 
subordinate wholes contained non-spatially in the sonata as a whole. 
 
In a sonata with three movements, a fast, a slow, and a final fast 
movement, it may so happen that to some people the slow movement is 
known, but not the two other movements. They then know the slow 
movement as a gestalt, but not as a subordinate gestalt. As a 
subordinate gestalt “it” will be a qualitatively different gestalt 
determined by the sonata as a whole. “It” is written between quotes 
because of the abstract status of that which we talk about. A most 
clearly and easily describable difference of quality is experienced 
during the transition from the fast to the slow movement. The slowness 
will then be apperceived in sharp contrast to the fast. When only known 
as a separate gestalt, the beginning of the slow movement will not have 
its slowness as sharply pronounced. Naturally, people not interested in 
certain kinds of music do not have access to these spontaneously 
experienced realities. But they may have access to other music 
unexplored by the sonata lovers. 
 
If somebody utters “menacing!” and points to something, there is 
perhaps a menacing something that needs immediate defensive action. 
Or there is absolutely no need, because of the absence of structural 
relationships that suggest immediate danger. Does the something 
nevertheless have the property to be menacing ontologically on par with 
its colour and length? Yes, ontologically, but not socially and 
pragmatically. We understand that from socially accepted criteria of 
being, we are mistaken if we expect an attack. We may be as wrong in 
our estimation of actual menace as of actual length. 
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Or, in the terminology of relationism, there is a constellation of 
relations in which the utterance “menacing!” makes up a part. The 
constellation has gestalt character: One cannot adequately cut up that 
constellation in such a way that there is some subject, N.N., which has a 
conscious experience of something outside its consciousness that is 
menacing. There is strictly speaking no subject of such a kind, nor any 
consciousness, nor any material things which are (rightly or falsely) 
conceived as themselves being menacing. That is, there are no 
potentially separable such things. Sarvam dharman nihsvabhavam! 
(Every element is non-separate-self-existent!). 
 
All different answers to whether the water in a definite jug at a definite 
time is cold, warm or something else, are not equally valid socially, 
according to Protagoras. Humans are sometimes in a natural state (kata 
fysin, secundum naturam). In that state, humans each experience 
approximately the same sensation when dipping their hands into water. 
Water near the freezing point is then felt to be cold. But this does not 
mean that it is not also warm and even hot. The socially correct answer 
to the question “Is the water in the jug cold?” is “Yes.” 
 
In short, I wish to justify my view that reality has secondary and tertiary 
qualities. And that these qualities inhere in it as firmly as any other kind 
of quality, if there exist other kinds. 
 
On the other hand, I wish to avoid certain pitfalls that Bishop Berkeley 
perhaps fell into. I wish to avoid what loosely is called idealism of 
spiritualism in favour or realism. 
 
Gestalt thinking combined with nominalism results in saying that the 
subject/object dualism is simply a projection of subjective states of 
consciousness on the outside world. But the joyfulness, liveliness, 
threatening size, dejectedness, gravity, or solemnity of a tree are 
properties of a tree on par with tallness, weight, and chemical structure. 
More precisely: the properties refer to situations or states of the world 
(Nature) which have gestalt character. The chemical or physical tree is 
an abstraction referring to elements, subordinate gestalts of the total 
gestalt. 
 
If A says “The tree is mournful” and B says “The tree is jubilant” there 
is no contradiction as long as “the tree” is not meant to characterize the 
same gestalt, but only elements (identified through social conventions: 
pointing to “the tree,” mapping it, touching it etc). 
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What A and B talk about is states of the world without a subject 
(epistemological ego). If C says “I see a jubilant tree,” there is a subject 
(if C genuinely describes an experience). 
 
Gestalt thinking brings poetry and science close together in the sense 
that genuine poetical descriptions, that is, descriptions of experiences, 
are taken to be on the same level of ontological reality as the physical, 
chemical, geological, ecological, etc. The experienced world is taken to 
be the world, and the experienced world is one of gestalts. Lebenswelt 
is not identical with any physical model, nor ecological. 
 
Good popularizations of abstract structure research need familiar 
gestalts to make the structure seem to be close to familiar contents. 
Consider the example below using text, dots, stars, and spaces: 
 
       *   *    *        **  
  The life story of our galaxy, the Milky Way, is the 
           *                       * 
 history of our cosmic ancestry. We ourselves are made of  
   carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, iron and dozens of other    
                             ** 
   elements, which astrophysics believe were cooked inside                  
 
             *     *  
   the stars that lived and died in the Milky Way before the     
        ** 
   sun was born. 
 
This is taken from Beatric M.Tinsley, a teacher of astronomy at Yale.1
 
The stars suggest concreteness of metaphors used. Popularization of the 
“hard” natural sciences is a mixed blessing: It lets us be aware of 
gigantic structural relationships in time and space, but confuses us 
about what is the content of reality. 
 
Experiences in terms of gestalts cannot properly be articulated through 
sentences ending with a full stop. The most appropriate is the 
exclamation mark. In logic and related fields the exclamation mark 
indicates imperative announcements. But there are other kinds of 
exclamations. We shall have need of several. 
 
Gestalts like melodies or works of art as experienced realities have 
appeal. If I play a melody for an audience some may be unimpressed. 
No melody-gestalt is formed. If a gestalt is formed, an appeal is there, 
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negative or positive, or with other appeal qualities. Thus there is no 
need of a concept of completely neutral gestalts. Even “indifferent!” is 
an exclamation. 
Part 2 
(1995) 
 
It we look up the indices in contemporary well-known philosophical 
treatises we shall rarely find much under the heading “real,” “reality,” 
or “ontology.” But many of the sections deal with what is traditionally 
associated with those terms. I shall start with some burning questions in 
the philosophy of science. 
 
Until the emergence of general relativity and quantum physics, 
theoretical physics with interest in problems of foundations could 
explain fairly easily and very convincingly what was mathematics and 
what was physics in their so-called mathematical physics. At that time 
as today (purely) mathematical assertions are conceived as categorically 
different. From a set of mathematical assertions as premises no physical 
ones can be concluded, and vice versa. The argumentation leading to 
the field equations of Einstein, for instance, is expressed by a mile long 
procession of (rather boring, but not easy) purely mathematical 
transformations. The physical content cannot be scaled off! This means 
that there are no scientific concepts of the physical world any more, not 
to speak of the physical reality. But that does not mean that the 
questions of realness and reality are not highly interesting and 
important any longer. On the contrary, interest increases! 
 
So do questions about the reality of numbers and logic. We now know 
the real value of pi, 3.14159 . . ., more than 400 million decimals. In 
what consists the reality of the infinite series of numbers? Maybe we 
should deny the “Platonic” reality of numbers? 
 
Let me make a new start discussing realness and unrealness. 
 
We ask sometimes “Is it really so? Is not this rather illusionary? 
virtual? visionary? Doesn’t it lack substance? Isn’t it really a nothing?” 
We sometimes talk about grades: I find so and so more real than so and 
so. In some contexts something acknowledged as existing does not 
count as real: there are dreams, illusions exist. That is, if we in the 
dream fly out of the window, it will not really be so. 
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The philosophical discipline ontology contains hypotheses about what 
is, and what is not, real. The following are simplifications, but may be 
useful as a starting point: 
 
Descartes said that only the atoms and the void are real. George 
Berkeley said “esse est percipi,” there is no reality beyond our 
perceptions (except God, perhaps). Cosmologists of today tend to 
identify reality with the cosmos. There are immense clusters of 
galaxies, the Milky Way is one of them. Inside the galaxies we have 
solar systems, . . . and somewhere there I am writing this. 
 
“Gestalt ontology” is a convenient name for a set of tentative answers 
to some of the questions raised in ontology. 
 
A classical one: If I feel one of my hands to be cold and the other to be 
hot, and I put them both in a tub of water it may happen that I say: 
“This water is cold according to my hot hand, and hot according to my 
cold hand.” What is the water really? The standard kind of answer is 
“neither.” With our kind of sensory equipment, we “project” warmth 
and coldness “into” the water. It is purely subjective! Protagoras, 
according to Sextus Empiricus, answered “Both! Both cold and warm!” 
(“The both-and answer.”) “Contradiction! Contradiction!” the neither-
people shout. And there are two logical contradictions in the 
neighbourhood. “The water is hot and it is not so that the water is hot” 
and “The water is cold and it is not so that the water is cold.” But that 
does not really touch what Protagoras is supposed to have said. “The 
water is both cold and hot” is not a contradiction but a description of 
two gestalts. Reality may be much richer and much fuller of relations 
than one usually thinks or seems to think. As real as standard things, 
chair and tables and mugs with water. We may have water W1 in 
contact with hand H1, and water W1 in contact with hand H2. The 
exclamations “cold!” and “hot!” may both be excellent descriptions of 
two realities, two parts of an overwhelmingly rich reality. The so-called 
“water” with no sensory qualities whatsoever may be an abstraction 
from reality, a very useful but misleading name of immensely important 
structures of part of reality. 
 
“Shall we go and see Mr. NN this morning?” This does not mean to 
look at him and then leave. To see Mr. NN may be analyzed as a very 
complex gestalt. If he is ‘seen’ through may years the gestalt changes, 
but it may of course remain stable for some time. The author Niko 
Kazantzakis starts his book on Jesus with a famous description of the 
waiting for and longing for a Messiah among Jews at the time of the 
birth of Jesus. As an artist, Kazantzakis is able to give word to 
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spontaneous experiences which are highly complex, but nevertheless 
make up units, not a heap of fragments. 
 
What does a river mean? What was meant by the thousands who said 
“Let the river live?” Obviously we are right when we in our daily life 
point out that there is a river and a set of personal and national attitudes 
to it. The river is wet, the attitudes are not wet. But nobody can see, or 
even think of, any river stripped of meaning.  
 
When we first hear about gestalt ontology it seems to be very different 
from other ontologies. But that impression is scarcely tenable. Let us 
inspect a list of what is real, a list made by non-philosophers or 
philosophers: material things, liquids, hardware, sounds, waves—
“objects,” and then toothaches, pains in general, joys, percepts, the 
thought of a calf with two heads, numbers. As not real we have: the 
illusions of winged horses, the castle we dreamed about last night, etc. 
Philosophers’ ontologies are conveniently classified as materialistic, 
idealistic, monistic, dualistic, etc. Only if these lists comprise things-in-
themselves, existing things with only length and certain other “primary 
qualities” there is a clear conflict with gestalt ontology. What we do in 
gestalt ontology is practically only to insist on, not only to suggest, a 
difference between contents of the real and the abstract structures of the 
real. The difference is acknowledged by most ontologies. They are 
comparable with gestalt ontology, but it belongs to the latter to focus on 
the difference. It leads to a rejection of too sharp a difference between 
what is called “subjective” and what is called “objective.” This gestalt 
ontology has, in common with many other contemporary ontologies, a 
reaction against what is thought to be the opinions of Descartes, 
Newton, and others. The river itself cannot be identified with its 
chemistry or its physics, nor with an x, the river as a Ding an sich. 
What gestalt ontology does is to remind one of the inescapable 
complexity and unity of the river as spontaneously experienced, and 
therefore not at all rejecting everyday life conceptions. Other ontologies 
might want to go beyond ordinary language. This is not the approach of 
gestalt ontology but is compatible with it.  
Gestalt Ontology and Phenomenology 
Gestalt psychology, phenomenology, perception-primacy—these terms, 
and what they express to very different interpreters, are highly relevant 
to gestalt ontology. 
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Certainly many philosophers down the ages have started in the way 
Merleau Ponty suggests.2  The notion of spontaneous experience is a 
good example of a notion pretending to cover the unreflected. It 
belongs to phenomenology, but, as far as I can judge, at least slightly, 
from the most well known phenomenological concepts. Husserl tended 
to reject Gestalt psychology entirely. Thinking in terms of gestalt 
ontology implies rejection of at least one central part of Gestalt 
Psychology, but certainly not all. 
 
In so far as Gestalt psychologists accept the last assertion of this 
remark, they certainly try to solve different problems than gestalt 
ontologists. The latter try to avoid introducing the term “consciousness” 
(without of course denying that we are conscious beings). It also avoids 
introducing questions relating to dependency of spontaneous 
experiences upon physiology, chemistry and physics. It is said that we 
must assume the existence of our brains. But the relevant point is that 
this assumption is not part of gestalt ontology. The gestalt ontologist, as 
such, reacts with epoché (self restraint) in this case, neither acceptance 
nor rejection. 
 
It is not the business of gestalt ontology to describe the relation of 
gestalts to the natural order of events. This order is taken for granted in 
the way it is in ordinary life. We may say “Could you please describe 
your spontaneous experiences while looking at this picture and 
throwing it into the fire?” We presume that there is a person listening, a 
picture and a fireplace, but in a non-flective manner. This sentence 
belongs to the metagestalt ontology. 
 
The postulate of the radical and absolute originality of consciousness 
serves to distance the phenomenology of Husserl from naturalness and 
natural science, and more generally from assertions of facts. This goal 
is not inherent in the pursuit of gestalt ontology. It partakes in the 
endeavour to loosen up to the subject/object dualism, retaining 
subject/object distinctions made in everyday life (the life-space 
environment), but trying to avoid a philosophical quagmire which 
threatens more absolutistic distinctions. Being conscious of something 
is admittedly of extreme practical and theoretical importance. But it 
may be useful to avoid the word “consciousness.” Relinquishing the 
word we may more easily avoid what Husserl calls idealism. His 
terminology includes two central terms of idealism: idea and 
consciousness. 
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Merleau-Ponty rescues the aspect of Gestalt psychology which is 
important to gestalt ontologists. His way of formulating what is rescued 
is in terms of spontaneous organization. 
 
The term “spontaneous organization” is of course of interest to gestalt 
ontologists. But from their point of view, it is somewhat misleading. 
The underlying assumption is that of ‘tabula dynamica’ (1) stimuli 
reach the sense organs and the central nervous system, (2) the stimuli 
are subjected to intricate processes, “organization” if you wish, and by 
some unknown process, (3) the lucky owner of the system experiences 
something, for instance a tree just in front of him. A vast synthesis is 
thought to lie ‘behind’ the spontaneous experience. From the point of 
view of gestalt ontology, there are no stimuli which present reality 
before these stimuli are ‘organized.’ They are not given colour through 
the organizing agency of perception. We have direct access to reality in 
our spontaneous experience, but no good guide as to how to act. We 
must acquire social and abstract structural knowledge. The 
argumentation concerning this is based on such concepts and 
experiences as visual perception of figures like the duck rabbit, the 
Necker cube, the Peter-Paul goblet, and so on. Experience shifts 
looking at such figures makes sense given the hypotheses of gestalts as 
flexible forms of organization. 
Experience and Gestalt 
Suppose three people are walking together and one says to the other 
two: “Look at that tree!” The spontaneous experiences of the two 
persons presumably have much in common, but presumably there is 
also much they ‘see’ differently. What they see may be said to be “full 
of meaning,” but not the same meanings. One is perhaps struck by 
seeing it momentarily as a Christmas tree and a world of meanings 
related to good and bad memories from last Christmas colours the 
intricate stream of “meanings” which are internally related to what we 
conventionally call the seeing of the tree. Intentionality is, of course, 
implied but not necessarily “an organization of the so-called elements.” 
Gestalt ontology does not accept a reality that is somehow the tree in 
itself. We do not project meanings into the tree. There is no tree itself 
plus a process of organization resulting in two different successions of 
spontaneous experiences.  
 
If the one, but not the other, spontaneously “sees” the tree as a kind of 
Christmas tree, what he sees is reality, but not the same part of reality 
Volume 21, Number 1 127
as the others. His personal particularities make him capable of seeing a 
part that the others do not see.  
 
Speaking is a social affair, and the utterance “Look at that tree!” plus 
pointing in a definite direction make the two people look at something 
classed as a tree in the public language.  
 
The decision point is the following: Because of the different 
background, past experiences, mental capacities, two persons have 
access to different parts of (an indefinitely rich) reality, contact with 
reality and need not “organize” something. 
 
If one person utters “How joyful it is!,” and the other “How 
melancholic! Look at the branches pointing down, not up!,” there is no 
neutral tree making different impressions. Speech makes it possible for 
the two persons to identify in space and time a definite something. But 
if we say that it has no colour, and certainly no joyfulness (the 
“secondary” and “tertiary” sense qualities), we refer to a social way of 
identification, not to reality. Because of the complexity and the internal 
relations between the complex features, of the spontaneous experiences 
of reality, reality may be said to have gestalt character. The socially 
definable something is an abstract structure of reality, not a content or 
part of reality. In gestalt ontology we are led to distinguish concrete 
content and abstract structure. 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 Beatric M.Tinsley. “Life and Death in the Milky Way.” Natural History, Vol. 85, 
No. 3, 1976, p. 74,. 
 
2Maurico Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, Northwestern University Press, 
1964, p. 92. 
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